SVP Risk: Challenging “Likely to Reoffend"

“…existing research indicates the vast majority of sex offenders, including those with a relatively high sexual recidivism risk, can be safely managed in the community.”

Dr. Grant Duwe

Research Director, MN DOC

With those words and supporting research, Grant Duwe has made it more difficult to justify sexual offender civil commitment (SOCC). Duwe is the Research Director of the Minnesota Department of Corrections – the source of most of the SVP clients at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). This new research [1] might provide the strongest empirical evidence to date that the gateway into SOCC should be a little tighter, and the exits out could safely be a little wider.

Duwe’s research briefly stated: Duwe administered the MnSOST-3 to 105 men under SOCC at MSOP (about 15% of the census). He applied the results to data from other recidivism studies to arrive at an estimated rate of future reoffending (assuming SVPs were immediately and unconditionally discharged). The outcome projected that, after four years, about one in ten men would reoffend. Using extrapolation and the more sensitive measure of arrests, rather than convictions, Duwe estimated that over ten years (an additional six years) one more SVP in ten would reoffend. When he extended his estimates out over 50 years (effectively the lifetime for most offenders), he determined that in the subsequent 40 years another 10% would reoffend, for a total 50-year recidivism rate of 30%. Duwe concluded that, in their lifetime, seven in ten released SVPs would not reoffend.

When he applied the same data to the higher threshold of conviction (rather than arrest) rate, he determined, in their lifetime, four out of five (82.4%) SVPs would not reoffend. He went further in making adjustments for guys[2] who had reoffended but not been arrested, and still determined the overwhelming majority of SVPs in the sample would not reoffend.

Duwe’s research projects lifetime recidivism (re-arrests) of 28%, but notes that with estimation error and a CI of 95%, 50-year (lifetime) recidivism has a lower bound of 21.4% and an upper bound of 35.7%. With some measure of successful treatment, applications of RNR principles, and prudent post-release monitoring and supervision, Duwe’s research supports a lower actuarial risk of SVP reoffending than widely believed. On an individual basis, some dynamic variables may be mitigating, while others could be aggravating. Still, at face value, this outcome calls into question one of the fundamental criteria for SOCC: establishing “likely” or “highly likely” to reoffend.[3] This question of semantics was at issue in a recent case before the Minnesota Court of Appeals. [4]

With the controversies swirling around the use of certain diagnoses to establish the “mental disorder” requirement for SOCC, concerns about the dynamic nature of “volition,” and indications that most actuarial risk tools tolerate a high level of false positives, Duwe’s research further confounds efforts to sustain a sound empirical basis for SOCC.

Other recent research supports the contention that actual recidivism for SVPs is much lower than public perception or other actuarial predictions. In 2012, Robin Wilson, Jan Looman, and their colleagues published research [5] reporting 3.2% - 5.5% recidivisms for recently released SVPs. The study had a short follow-up period (2.5 years), but in that time, 14 of 253 (5.5%) men released from the Regional Treatment Centre [6]had reoffended, and only one out of 31 guys released from the Florida Civil Commitment Center had reoffended. The offenders in the Wilson et al. (2012) study were selected for their completion of treatment, but the results indicate that reoffending for these SVPs are consistent with low rates of sexual reoffending found in other studies.

There are some SVP recidivism data published in the annual surveys of the Sexual Offender Civil Commitment Programs Network (SOCCPN). Not all SOCCPN members contribute data to the annual survey, and the compiled results have an anecdotal quality to them, but with about 17 of 20 SVP states reporting outcomes, the annual surveys of programs have some empirical basis. The 2011 Annual Survey reports that 75 more men had been fully released and there was no reported sexual or non-sexual recidivism. The 2012 Annual Survey reported that four clients were known to have sexually reoffended out of an apparent total of 159 discharges. The latter survey did not indicate the time period for which those four clients had been released.

In a 2011 review of SOCC in the state of Virginia, it was reported that, of the 78 clients on conditional release since the program’s inception in 2003, three (4%) have reoffended.[7] The same report cites SVP recidivism rates ranging from zero to five percent in six other states. The Virginia report indicates that some reoffending was of a technical nature, further illustrating some of the problems with recidivism data. Even with some ambiguity around outcome data, it would seem reasonable to conclude from these studies that there is a low incidence of sexual recidivism, even among SVP clients.

In the interests of accuracy, there is research reporting much higher rates of sexual reoffending among certain groups of sexual offenders, but if it is older research, it may simply be outdated. From 1990 to 2002 the three year reconviction rate for sexual offenders in MN dropped from over 16% to under 3%. [1]   More recent research from the MN DOC reveals a four-year reconviction rate of 2.8%,[8] which is consistent with data from other states.[9]  With some actuarial risk tools able to distinguish risk factors that correlate to reoffending, some sexual offenders can be determined to be at higher actuarial risk for reoffending, but the point remains that sexual offending and reoffending has dramatically declined in the last two decades,[10] and the data herein indicates that trend appears to also hold for high-risk sexual offenders.

Duwe raises important questions about public polices with regard to sexual offending and the cost of crime control. Actuarially, if ten guys were released from MSOP today, four years from now nine of them will have not reoffended. Is that acceptable risk management? Some would argue that reducing sexual abuse at any cost is in the public interest, but public officials have a responsibility for cost-effective public safety. With the 2013 cost of SOCC in Minnesota, Duwe’s research supports the contention that actuarially, the public cost of preventing one in ten SVPs from reoffending over four years is $4,750,000. [11]

With 95% of all sexual offenses being committed by first time offenders [12], sexual abuse professionals agree that we need to do a lot more on the side of preventing first time offenders. Is it a good allocation of public funds to spend $4.75M to try to stop one known offender from possibly reoffending?  It seems investing $4.75M in broad sexual abuse prevention efforts might save a great many more future victims from harm.

Given public intolerance for any incidence of sexual offending, a prediction of one in ten guys reoffending over four years will not sit well with many. Duwe’s estimate of “only” three in ten SVP clients reconvicted over 50 years may be of little comfort to the general public, but the courts, in their need to reconcile “likely” to reoffend, may take another view of this research.

Those that have been following the MSOP saga know that there has been only one guy that has remained conditionally released out of almost 700 clients over nearly 20 years. No one has ever completed the treatment program and, if current conditions hold, clients are far more likely to die at MSOP than be released. [13]  This description is not to lay blame on the doorstep of MSOP, but rather to illustrate the overwhelming sense of hopelessness faced by MSOP clients, and a mandate for MSOP staff made ineffectual by unresolved competing interests. SVP programs elsewhere in the US face comparable challenges.

The oldest SVP program in the US, in the state of Washington, was under federal oversight from 1994-2007.  In 2012 the federal courts also intervened in Minnesota, certified all clients at MSOP to be part of a class-action lawsuit, and signaled that immediate changes are needed.  Some changes are in the works, but the executive and legislative branches of Minnesota’s state government would be wise to recognize the opportunity to take stock of Duwe’s research.

Duwe has provided empirical support for a more effective balance between prudent public safety and effective management of SVPs. His report is consistent with recommendations found in the 2011 report from the MN Office of the Legislative Auditor, and with the December, 2012 report from the MN SOCC Advisory Task Force. To be sure, not all the clients at MSOP should be immediately released into the community, but Duwe has documented that there is every reason to believe that the low base rates for sexual offending broadly, would also inure to SVP programs.

Principles of Risk-Need-Responsivity have empirical support for guiding the treatment and management of sexual offenders; there’s every reason to believe it would also be useful to guide SOCC. Courts might be able to use the option of a judicial stay of commitment or order less restrictive alternatives, when appropriate - perhaps community-based residential programs or outpatient programs as in Texas and other states. Outpatient or aftercare programs can track SVPs with active GPS, to help ensure public safety. Good supervision and monitoring combined with proven support programs such as Circles of Support and Accountability offer alternatives to secure detention for SVPs.

Duwe has quite credibly documented that a majority of the clients at MSOP could be safely managed in the community. If those who currently control SOCC in Minnesota and other states ignore the relevance of Duwe’s compelling research, it is quite likely that the state and federal courts will not.

Jon Brandt, MSW, LICSW

Note: Dr. Duwe has given permission to publish his email address if readers have questions about his study or would like a copy of his research: grant.duwe@state.mn.us

 

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[1] Duwe, G. (in press). To what extent does civil commitment reduce sexual recidivism? Estimating the selective incapacitation effects in Minnesota. Journal of Criminal Justice; online 7/5/2013. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047235213000482

Abstract: This study examines the selective incapacitation effects of civil commitment on sexual reoffending among 105 Minnesota sex offenders who were civilly committed between 2004 and 2006. The Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-3, a sexual recidivism risk assessment instrument, was used to estimate what the four-year sexual recidivism rate would have been for these offenders had they been released to the community. Integration of Survival with Quality of Life (iSQoL) software was used to extrapolate the survival curves over a 50-year period to develop a lifetime sexual recidivism estimate. If the 105 civilly committed sex offenders had been released to the community, an estimated nine percent would have been reconvicted of a new sex offense within four years. Civilly committing these offenders therefore likely reduced the overall four-year sexual recidivism rate by 12 percent. The results further suggest that if these offenders had been released to the community, an estimated 28 percent would be rearrested for another sex offense within their lifetime. To better align the costs of civil commitment with its public safety benefits, states operating these programs should emphasize the use of intermediate alternatives in the community for a more positive return on investment.

[2] There are over 4,200 men in SVP programs in the US and appear to be fewer than ten females (SOCCPN, 2012); male pronouns and references are not only appropriate, but because virtually all sex offender studies have male cohorts, some studies may not be valid with females. Some guys enter SOCC directly from the juvenile system, before they get a chance to be “men.” More than 50 guys at MSOP do not have an adult sexual offense.

[3] Assuming statutory recidivism risk estimates are intended to be absolute (rather than relative).

[4] In Re: the Civil Commitment of Cedrick Scott Ince. http://mn.gov/lawlib/archive/ctapun/1303/opa121691-031813.pdf

[5] Wilson, R. J., Looman, J., Abracen, J., & Pake, D. R. (2012). Comparing sexual offenders at the Regional Treatment Centre (Ontario) and the Florida Civil Commitment Center. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology XX(X) 1–19.

[6] Canada does not have SOCC; the Regional Treatment Centre is for treating higher risk offenders.

[7] Review of the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators (2011). Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, Commonwealth of Virginia; November 14, 2011. http://jlarc.virginia.gov/meetings/November11/SVP.pdf

[8] Of the 1,653 sex offenders released from Minnesota Prisons between 2004 and 2006, 47 (2.8 percent) had been reconvicted of a new sex offense within four years of their release from prison. (Duwe, 2013) at p. 14.  Among the 220 sex offenders released from prison during the 1990s, by the end of 2010, 41 (18.6 percent) had been reconvicted of a new sex offense. Among the 261 referred offenders who were not committed, 17 (6.5%) were reconvicted of a new sex crime within four years. Of the 1,392 offenders who were reviewed but not referred, 30 (2.2%) reoffended within four years. (Duwe, 2013) at p. 15.

[9] Recidivism among sex offenders in Connecticut, State of Connecticut, Office of Policy and Management, Criminal Justice Policy & Planning Division, February 15, 2012; at p. 5.

http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/cjppd/cjresearch/recidivismstudy/sex_offender_recidivism_2012_final.pdf
In 2005, 746 offenders who had served a prison sentence for a least one sex-related offense were released or discharged from prison. Over the next five years:

· 27 (3.6%) of these men were arrested and charged with a new sex crime.

· 20 (2.7%) were convicted for new sex offense, and

· 13 (1.7%) were returned to prison to serve a sentence for a new sex crime.

[10] Jones, L.M., Finkelhor, D., & Halter, S. (2006). Child maltreatment trends in the 1990s: Why does neglect differ from sexual and physical abuse? Child Maltreatment, 11, 107-120.

[11] Duwe estimates one SVP in ten would reoffend in four years. The cost of keeping ten SVPs at MSOP for four years at a per diem of $326, for FY 2013 (https://edocs.dhs.state.mn.us/lfserver/Public/DHS-5939-ENG), would be calculated at: $326 x 365 x four years x 10 SVPs = $4,759,600.

[12] Sandler, J.C., Freeman, N. J., & Socia, K. M. (2008) DOES A WATCHED POT BOIL? A Time-Series Analysis of New York State’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law; Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 2008, Vol. 14, No. 4, 284–302.

[13] At least 24 guys have died at MSOP (SOCCNP, 2012), furthering clients’ perception of endless therapeutic goals that don’t credibly lead to release.

A guest post by Dr. Kieran McCartan

The Punitive-Social Action Paradox

Kieran McCartan, Ph.D.

It is an interesting time in the world of sexual offender policy and practice internationally, with what seems to be something of a paradoxical turn. Governments are becoming more conservative in how they respond to sexual offending (with increased and more punitive sentences) while simultaneously investing in viable community engagement/partnerships in an attempt to solve issues around sexual offender reintegration. This is interesting because it raises the questions of why this has happened and what the future is for sexual offender management, post-austerity? Is this truly an informed government response based on what different “publics” want (e.g., more punitive sanctions, greater public protection, and increased devolvement of criminal justice responses so that they can feel engaged as well as represented), a complex response to austerity, or too many political voices talking at the same time in the run up to election?

If we look at the UK as a case in point, there has been a series of changes in the structure, function, and role of the criminal justice system in dealing with offenders. This has come as a result of government policies (Conservative - Liberal Democratic coalition), heightened and ongoing media discourses (resulting from the Wales care home scandal, increased reporting of historical crimes,  Operation Yewtree focusing on celebrity sexual abuse cases, and a refocus on online sexual abuse and child sexual abuse imagery), and austerity cuts. The outcome has been two interrelated but separate responses, creating a paradox (of sorts):

1. Changes to the existing systems - During the life of the current coalition government (2010 onwards), there has been financial change with continued reductions in police, probation, and prison funding across the board. This has resulted in major changes in the construction and layout in the criminal justice systems of the three judicial areas (England & Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland). This has seen:

• The introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners in England & Wales, based on an American model;
• The merging of the eight Scottish police forces into one ‘national’ police force;
• The restructuring of probation in England & Wales from a multitude of probation areas into one probation board with local boards empowered by self-determination and localism;
• The closure of prisons in the UK resulting in the restructuring of existing prisons (e.g., Ashfield prison has been converted from a youth offenders prison to a sexual offenders over summer 2013) and the resurfacing of conversations of a titan supermax prison for the UK; and
• A new approach to offender management and rehabilitation, including with respect to sexual offenders; touted by the Ministry of Justice as focusing on social capital and desistance.

All of these issues contribute to a belief that existing agencies are being asked to do more with less in an era when sentencing guidelines regarding sexual violence are being re-examined and more people are being prosecuted for sexual offences. These developments will require that alternatives to ‘traditional’ criminal justice responses need to be found.

2. Changes in the role of the public engagement - The current coalition government’s push towards greater community engagement, localism, and social action in the field of criminal justice has also presented challenges. The government believe that communities need to assist the criminal justice system in the reintegration of offenders, because offenders—especially sexual offenders—come from communities, and they will go back to communities upon release. However, in many cases, communities have been reluctant to assume these responsibilities.

This does not mean that community members will somehow replace Probation, Police, or Social Work. Rather, the expectation is that they will work in tandem, meaning that the public should play some key role in assisting offenders to reengage with the larger community during re-entry. This is based on the notion that positive social capital can help to reduce reoffending through encouraging desistance; because offenders with community engagement will feel less isolated, more integrated and are, therefore, more likely engage with others in ways that are more pro-social and, ultimately, less harmful. Such efforts can be seen in various restorative justice projects in the UK and internationally; for example, A.I.M, New Leaf, and Circles of Support and Accountability. The CoSA project in Hampshire and Thames Valley (now known as Circles South-East) recently celebrated its 10^th anniversary, with an attendant evaluation.

The social action/community partnership approach also has a secondary public health function, apart from offender reintegration. This function is to educate the community about the realities of offenders and offending, so that they are better able to detect, prevent, and report. However, there is a real world misconception about social action and community engagement—cost. In the age of austerity, community-centric, social action approaches often use volunteers, who can be seen as cost-saving as opposed to the cost-neutral or cost-deficit approach of using professionals (e.g., Probation, Social Workers, etc). In reality, this is not the case, as volunteer programs have costs associated with design and implementation, training, and program support (i.e., they require some aspect of supervision by a trained professional).  Cost-benefit analyses of CoSA projects in the UK and USA were recently published, each showing substantial benefits to the use of volunteers in sexual offender re-entry.

Although the focus here has been on the UK example, this punitive-social action paradox is truly a worldwide debate, with increased regulation and debate, changing attitudes regarding reintegration, and an increased public debate about “governmentality” and control in criminal justice. For instance, we have seen the following issues and events unfold over the recent past:

1. Punitive Action: The investigation and prosecution of rape in India; a conservative turn in criminal justice policy in Canada; increased conversations about the role and responsibility of the internet internationally; and civil commitment, community notification, and zoning restriction debates in the USA.
2. Social Action: The international growth in movements like Circles of Support and Accountability; increased public health debates worldwide regarding sexual violence prevention, including but not limited to school education; and the development of outreach programmes for persons at risk, like Project Prevention Dunkenfeld in Germany.

This leaves us with an interesting paradox, for on one hand the government is saying that sexual offenders are problematic and, as such, we need to be more punitive and their sentencing reviewed. On the other hand, they are saying that criminal justice funding is being cut, services restructured and, therefore, the community must play a greater role. So, which is the correct answer/interpretation? The answer is, as we know, both and neither. Sexual offenders are truly a heterogeneous population where a one size fits all model struggles. We are keenly aware that approaches appropriate for one may not be appropriate for another. How do we resolve this paradox? I am not sure that we can, but what we can do is be politically and socially engaged so that we offer clear, consistent, and informed advice to both statutory and community groups so that reasonable decisions are made that have the potential to balance public protection against offender rehabilitation, risk management, and reintegration.

Dr. Kieran McCartan is an Associate Professor in Criminology at the University of the West of England in Bristol, UK.

What Could Those Empathy Researchers Be Thinking? Complications, Controversies, Research, and Practice

The above title is a weak attempt at humor. Many of the best and brightest in our field have touted the importance of empathy in the treatment of sexual offenders. It’s as though we’ve always known it in our hearts: If you truly understand someone’s internal experience, you’re less likely to hurt them.  Yet the available research begs to differ, and this is frustrating to many of us. What could the researchers have been thinking? And, what are we all feeling?

The June 2013 issue of Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment contains an article by Ruth Mann and Georgia Barnett titled, “Victim empathy intervention with sexual offenders: Rehabilitation, punishment, or correctional quackery?” It has already garnered considerable discussion in professional circles; although opinions remain divided. Perhaps, that is a good thing. It is time to consider the role of empathy in the lives of each individual who has sexually abused, rather than among large groups of sexual offenders.

Some history might be in order:

• From antiquity, most religious orders and spiritual groups valued empathy and compassion (e.g., “walking a mile in someone’s moccasins” is a common descriptor in parts of the USA, just as “seek first to understand” is among Steven Covey’s seven habits of highly effective people, and “Namaste” translates as “the light in me honors the light in you”).
• While much of our field emerged from behavioral-therapy attempts to reduce deviant sexual arousal, many of our field’s pioneers spoke of the importance of understanding victim experience (e.g., Jan Hindman).
• Concerns about treatment have sometimes focused on developing empathy among treatment participants who have high levels of psychopathic traits. Central to these concerns was that a focus on empathy might actually teach clients how to become more effective at exploitation.
• In 1996, a meta-analysis by Karl Hanson and Monique Bussière found that victim empathy was not predictive of sexual re-offense.
• In 2002, an influential book by Yolanda Fernandez and her colleagues emphasized, among other things, that empathy is difficult to measure and, therefore, difficult to research.
• Other research findings have suggested that while victim empathy (e.g., learning and understanding the harm one has done to specific individuals) is not predictive of sexual re-offense, empathy for others in general can be.
• In 2009 and 2013, Jill Levenson and I, along with our colleagues Shan Jumper and David D’Amora, published three studies of consumer satisfaction surveys. In each of these surveys, clients in two civil commitment programs and one outpatient practice stated that victim empathy and accountability are among the most important elements of treatment. Questions remain, however. Were these clients simply repeating back what they’d heard in treatment?

Into this breach step Mann and Barnett, who observe that as many as 95% of North American treatment programs for people who have sexually abused target victim empathy, which is rated among the top two treatment targets by those programs.  Mann and Barnett further remind us of the work of Paul Gendreau and his colleagues, who coined the term “correctional quackery” in response to programs that give priority to anecdotal evidence and the pet theories of administrators.

Mann and Barnett further describe the fuzzy definitions of empathy that have been included in studies, ranging from remorse to a variation of awareness, each of which can be very different experiences. They further observe an important but rarely discussed point: that a lack of empathy for past victims does not explain the willingness to abuse again in the future. They also note that after-the-fact minimization of harm is a common human experience.

In the end, the authors conclude, “None of the various meta-analyses of sex offender treatment program effectiveness have examined the impact of different treatment components at the level required to draw conclusions about victim empathy intervention” (p. 289). The authors also state, “We conclude from our review that the theoretical basis for victim empathy work with sexual offenders is inconsistently articulated, poorly understood, and largely untested empirically” (p. 295).

Under these conditions, it is difficult to know whether professionals should go off in search of more research or go home and take a long, hard look in the mirror. Maybe we are not as empathic and understanding as we would like to believe. Perhaps, if our methods and measures are as disparate as the research studies seem to indicate, we do not understand empathy as well as we think.

David S. Prescott, LICSW

Does Canada Need Harsher Penalties for Sexual Offenders?

            In the September 16, 2013 edition of the Globe and Mail, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper is quoted as having said:

“We do not understand why child predators do the heinous things they do and, in all frankness, we don’t particularly care to.”

            These comments were made during a press conference in Richmond, BC in support of the Conservative government’s plan to introduce legislation this fall to “crack down” on people who sexually abuse children. The proposed legislation will reportedly include consecutive sentencing, mandatory minimum sentences, and publicly accessible registries; practices currently popular in the United States.     

            The sexual abuse of children evokes strong emotional responses in every Canadian, especially when children are abducted, sexually abused, and murdered by predatory offenders. However, it is important to remember that, although tragic and troubling, these latter cases are truly rare. As difficult as it may be to comprehend, these extreme crimes are also virtually impossible to predict or prevent. The offenders who commit them, however, do not represent the norm when it comes to sexual abusers.

            Mr. Harper’s comments imply that there is little known about sexual offenders and the reasons why they commit their crimes. This is simply not true. We understand quite a lot about sexual offenders, including pedophiles. The vast majority of sexual offenders target family members or friends, not strangers, as is commonly believed. More than two-thirds of sex crimes occur in the victim’s own home, often committed by a parent. Some higher risk sexual offenders have strong sexual interests in children (pedophilia) that lead them to offend, but not all child molesters are pedophiles or necessarily at high risk to reoffend.

            Mr. Harper also stated that we don’t care to know why sexual offenders do what they do. The Prime Minister’s comments are disheartening. The first step towards prevention is understanding the nature of the problem. Mr. Harper carelessly trivializes the accomplishments of dozens of Canadians who have dedicated their lives and careers to better understanding sexual abuse, including why it happens, how to help offenders stop, and how to prevent the abuse from happening in the first place.

            For almost half a century, Canada’s approach to offender management has been the envy of the world. Rates of sexual offending and reoffending in Canada have been in steady decline for the past two to three decades. In explaining these trends, we can point to directly to advances in risk assessment, treatment methods, and community supervision and citizen engagement—most of the seminal research on these topics having its origins in Canada. Indeed, many Canadian practitioners have been recognized internationally for their contributions to public safety. At home, several have been appointed Fellows of the Royal Society of Canada or Officers of the Order of Canada—our highest civilian honour.

            So, does Canada need harsher penalties for sexual offenders? Canadian research has shown for years that we do not. In fact, Canadian research has conclusively shown that more punishment does not lead to less crime. Do we need more prisons? Not likely. Do we need more resources for treatment and abuse prevention programs? Absolutely. The real challenge is primary prevention: How do we stop it from happening in the first place?

             Canadians are understandably concerned about sexual abuse, but our system is not broken. Mr. Harper’s government seeks to implement US-style criminal justice and correctional measures. However, the American example holds a dark promise. The US incarcerates more of its citizens than any other country. Our American compatriots have become increasingly aware that they can no longer bear the financial and human costs of a “get tough on crime” agenda. Prior to pushing ahead with new legislation, Mr. Harper would be well-advised to both check with his American colleagues and to review Canada’s illustrious history in criminal justice research.

            Better still, if Mr. Harper should ever care to better understand these issues, he might take a look in his own back yard and quit scaring ordinary Canadians whose tax dollars have long contributed to the many effective solutions we already share with the world.

Robin J. Wilson, Ph.D., ABPP is a Canadian psychologist in private practice in Sarasota, FL, and an Assistant Clinical Professor (Adjunct) of Psychiatry and Behavioural Neuroscience at McMaster University in Hamilton, ON. He has worked with sexual and other offenders in hospital, correctional, and community settings for nearly 30 years.

Effects of Residency Restrictions on Risk and Sexual Offender Re-entry

Last week, a colleague of mine shared a US Department of Justice report on a list-serve to which we both belong (see the report at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/242952.pdf). This report, entitled “An Evaluation of Sexual offender Residency Restrictions in Michigan and Missouri” was completed by Beth M. Huebner, Timothy S. Bynum, Jason Rydberg, Kimberly Kras, Eric Grommon, and Breanne Pleggenkuhle, variously of the University of Missouri-St. Louis, Michigan State University, Indiana University Purdue University-Indianapolis, and Southern Illinois University-Carbondale. As the title suggests, these authors report findings associated with their research into the efficacy of residency restrictions on sexual offender risk and re-entry.

Residency restrictions have been a particularly popular means of controlling and containing sexual offenders in the community. Depending on the jurisdiction, the typical approach is to limit the distance within which sexual offenders can legally be regarding schools, playgrounds, daycare centers, or other places children might congregate. Such restrictions have significant impact on where offenders may live, work, or engage in other activities.

On the surface, such practices seem quite reasonable. If someone has engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with a child, then the amount of direct or indirect contact they might have with children should be limited or prohibited. However, as yet, such practices have not been subject to much scientific scrutiny. Moreover, of those investigations of residency restrictions completed to date, the findings suggest that there is little or no effect on outcome—sexual recidivism. Indeed, some have suggested that such restrictions may contribute to reduced social and community stability for released offenders (Levenson & Hern, 2007; Mercado, Alvarez, & Levenson, 2008; Socia, 2011; Willis & Grace, 2008, 2009), and that this potentially translates into an increase in risk, not the decrease intended. This study, completed in Illinois and Missouri, adds another voice to the chorus of research suggesting that residency restrictions are having little or none of their intended effects.

In order to complete their research, Huebner and associates identified 1,703 sexual offenders in MI and matched them to 1,703 non-sexual offenders. Additionally, they identified 2,265 sexual offenders and 2,265 unmatched but markedly similar non-sexual offenders. The following are key findings noted in the executive summary:

• There was a decline in the number of individuals living in restricted areas, including near schools or daycare centers, but the differences were not statistically significant.
• Analyses of residential patterns did not support previous research which suggests that residency restrictions would lead to large displacement of offenders to rural areas; however, supplemental analyses in Michigan found that sexual offenders – especially child molesters – moved more often relative to comparable non-sexual offenders after the implementation of residency restrictions.
• If residency restrictions have an effect on recidivism, the relationship is small.
• Given the very low base rate of sexual recidivism (3%), a longer period of follow-up would be required to better consider the long-term recidivism patterns of sexual offenders, particularly as they pertain to sexual offense convictions.

Based on their findings, Huebner et al. concluded that residency restrictions had little effect on recidivism. Additionally, they noted that their analyses provided confirmation that such restrictions may lead to reduced reintegration potential for released sexual offenders. They make several policy recommendations:

• Huebner et al. suggest that jurisdictions consider the use of risk assessment instruments when implementing restrictions as a means to identify those offenders most in need of such measures.
• There is a need to evaluate the length of the residency restrictions, considering the potential value-added to community safety when balanced against offender stability.
• Stable housing services should be the central focus of reentry planning, particularly for sexual offender populations.
• More research is needed on the provision of transitional housing.
• Enhanced research is required regarding residential movement patterns of sexual offenders over an extended period of time.
• Efforts are necessary to develop re-entry programming specific to sexual offender populations.

Huebner et al. also make suggestions for future research, including investigation of how residency restrictions might assist in risk management if implemented with that minority of released offenders who are at higher risk. Additionally, they call for additional research regarding the factors that might influence sexual offender desistance; particularly, if residency restrictions might actually increase risk in some cases. Huebner and her associates also suggest that we need better research regarding the costs and benefits of residency restrictions, including both supervision costs and those associated with relocation and collateral consequences for offenders and the communities in which they reside.

Of course, there are many complicated issues associated with the community risk management of persons who have sexually offended. Where they should live, with whom they live, and in what proximity to potential victims, are clearly topics of popular and legislative discussion. However, this report demonstrates, yet again, that it is important to evaluate the pros and cons of such practices for the various stakeholder groups likely to be affected. While residency restrictions may provide some degree of solace to the community-at-large, it is by no means clear that this solace is prudent, given the findings of studies like this. In my humble opinion, the solution is not likely to be found in severely limiting or ostracizing all sexual offenders, regardless of offense history and level of risk. Rather, we may find that providing support and accountability in exchange for better sexual and self-regulation is an equitable trade (see Wilson, McWhinnie, & Wilson, 2008). Huebner et al.’s suggestion of using standardized means to identify and focus on those offenders who pose the greatest degree of risk is wise, and consistent with what we already know to be so, given the tenets of Risk, Need, Responsivity-based approaches (see Andrews & Bonta, 2010) with which so many of us in the risk management field are already intimately familiar.

References

Andrews, D.A. & Bonta, J. (2010). The psychology of criminal conduct (5^th Edition).Cincinnati, OH: Anderson.

Levenson, J. S. & Hern, A. L. (2007). Sex offender residence restrictions: Unintended consequences and community reentry. Justice Research and Policy, 9, 59-73.

Mercado, C. C., Alvarez, S., & Levenson, J. S. (2008). The impact of specialized sex offender legislation on community reentry. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment

20, 188-205.

Socia, K. M. (2011). The policy implications of residence restrictions on sex offender housing in upstate, NY. Criminology & Public Policy, 10, 351-389.

Willis, G.M. & Grace, R.C. (2008). The quality of community reintegration planning for child molesters: Effects on sexual recidivism. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 20, 218-240.

Willis, G.M. & Grace, R.C. (2009). Assessment of community reintegration planning for sex offenders: Poor planning predicts recidivism. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 36, 494-512.

Wilson, R.J., McWhinnie, A.J & Wilson, C. (2008). Circles of Support & Accountability: An international partnership in reducing sexual offender recidivism. Prison Service Journal, 138, 26-36.